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Case No. -312(3/12

Plaintiff

STATE'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE REBUTTAL
TESTIMONY OF LABER

vs.
THE STATE OF

.)

omo,

Defendant

Defendant, State of Ohio, through and by counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting
Attorney, Cuyahoga County, Assistant Prosecutor A Steven Dever requests that this court

-

exclude the testimony of Laber. The reasons and authorities for denying the admissibility of
this evidence is outlined in the attached brief, which is incorporated by reference.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio
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Marilyn Barkley Cassidy
1 64 7)
A Steven Dever (0024982)
Cuyahoga County Prosecu r's Office
The Justice Center, Courts Tower
1200 Ontario Street
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendants

INTRODUCTION
LAW AND ARGUMENT
Rebuttal testimony is not for the purpose of bolstering a party's case in chief

A

rebuttal witness can only provide testimony in response to new matters introduced by a party
opponent. See, Moore v. Retter (10 Dist. 1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 167, 174. The general rule is
that:
[a] party upon whom the affirmative of an issue rests is bound to
give all his evidence in support of the issue in the first instance,
and can only give such evidence in reply as tends to rebut the
new matter introduced by his opponent. (emphasis added)
Id. at 174. See, also, Cities Service Oil Co. v. Burkett (1964), 176 Ohio St. 449, 452 (stating
that "[u]ndoubtedly, the proper time for the introduction of evidence in support of a litigants'
own case is during the introduction of his evidence in chief.."); Burke v. Schaffner (IO Dist.
1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 655 (refusing to allow rebuttal witness to testify since there was no
"new" evidence to rebut). "A party upon whom the affirmative of an issue rests is bound to
give all his evidence in support of the issue in the first instance, and can only give such
evidence in reply as tends to rebut the new matter introduced by his opponent." Burke v.
Schaffner, (1966), 114 Ohio App.3d 655, 665 [citations omitted].
It is anticipated that Laber will be offered to explain an "experiment" wherein he and/or

Epstein attempted to recreate the blood marks on a watch.
Laber' s testimony should be excluded from this trial because it is improper rebuttal
evidence. Plaintiffs own expert, Dr. Epstein, already testified during plaintiffs case in chief
that the spots on the watch were not spatter. Plaintiff has already presented evidence regarding

-

blood spatter and cannot again revisit the issue in order to bolster his case in chief
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Furthermore, the State's expert, Toby Welson, stated in his pre-trial report that some
blood on the watch was consistent with impact spatter. As a result, plaintiff knew that such
information was going to be raised as an issue at trial, and therefore was bound to give all
evidence in support of that issue in the first instance, i.e., during its case in chief Plaintiff, in
fact, did so with the testimony of Dr. Epstein, and therefore cannot revisit the blood spatter
issue on rebuttal.
No new evidence was introduced by the State that would allow plaintiff to call Laber
and to introduce his testimony regarding his "experiment" concerning blood spatter on a watch.
Therefore, Laber should be prohibited from testifying as a rebuttal witness.
Moreover, Laber's experiment is totally lacking in its reliability. See, Evid. R. 702(C)
which states:

-

(C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific,
technical, or other specialized information. To the extent that the
testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment,
the testimony is reliable only if all the following apply:
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is
based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from
widely accepted knowledge, facts, or principles;
(2) The design of the procedure, test or experiment reliably
implements the theory;
(3) The particular procedure, test or experiment was conducted
in a way that will yield an accurate result.
The factors enumerated in Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579,
testing, peer review, error rates, and acceptability are missing.
Here, Laber' s experiment lacks reliability for several reasons. The experiment Laber
performed was novel; had no controls; had no peer review; and had no documentation. Absent
these factors, the experiment was not scientifically valid. Furthermore, the watch he used was

3

not a 1950's era watch; it was not the same brand, size, metal, crystal, or make-up of Sam's
watch. Therefore, Laber' s experimental results should be excluded since they will not aid the
jury in its search for the truth, as required by the Ohio Supreme Court. See /shier v. Miller
(1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 447.
The Court should not permit the novel "watch experiments" especially since the Court
excluded experiments offered by defendants on the basis that they purportedly Jacked the same
scientific indicia reliability missing in the Laber "watch experiment".

Specifically, the Court

excluded Wentzel's pillow blood drying time experiments and Loveyjoy's blunt trauma to
skull experiments.
Additionally, as defendant has asserted in a previous motion, Dr. Laber' s report was not
timely submitted pursuant to the court's case management order (Loc.R.21.1 ). Pursuant to the
court's case management order, all supplemental reports were due January 31, 2000.

Dr.

Laber's report is dated February 14, 2000 and was served upon defendant, February 17, 2000.
"The trial court has discretion to determine whether a party has complied with Loe. R. 21.1 and
to determine the appropriate sanction for its transgression [citations omitted] . . . we find no
support for the motion that Loe. R. 21.1 does not apply to the production of expert reports used
for purposes of rebuttal.

Clearly by using the phrase 'all supplemental reports,' Loc.R.21.1

makes irrelevant the intended purpose of the report." Michael Dolan v. Cleveland Builders

Supply Co. (1993).
In Paugh and Farmer, Inc. v. Menorah Home for Jewish Aged (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d
44, the court excluded the testimony of appellant's expert witness because the appellant failed
to file an expert report within the period of time set forth in Loe. R. 21.

-

In Weyls v.

University Hosp.of Cleveland, (July 28, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65803, the trial court's

4

exclusion of a witness presenting expert testimony was upheld despite the fact that no case
management plan was in place. The court found Loe. R. 21.1 to be self- executing and requires
compliance by the parties, even where the court has failed to institute a case management plan.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

014647)
A. Steven Dever (00249 2)
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
The Justice Center, Courts Tower
1200 Ontario Street
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Motion to Exclude Testimony of Laber was served

this~

day of April, 2000, by hand delivery, upon Terry Gilbert, at Court Room 20-B, 1200 Ontario
Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

Kathleen A. Martin
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

5

1993 WL 215399, Dolan v. Cleveland Builders Supply Co., (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1993)

*215399
NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO
SUPREME
COURT
RULES
FOR
THE
REPORTING
OF
OPINIONS
IMPOSES
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIO NS ON THE
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
Michael DOLAN, et al., Plaintiff-Appellants,

v.
CLEVELAND BUILDERS SUPPLY CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 62711.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.
June 17, 1993.
Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No.
130,515. Affirmed.
Daniel J. Ryan, Cleveland, for plaintiff-appellants.
Joseph A. Farchione, Jr., Cleveland, for defendant-appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION

-

relationship with the bricklayer.
The Dolans moved into their new home in
November, 1977. In the summer of 1983, the Dolans
noticed certain bricks were failing. The faces of some
bricks began chipping off, a process referred to as
"spalling." The failure was particularly acute around
the chimney, the foundation walls, and the front
porch.
The bricks continued to deteriorate and
affected other areas of the house as of the time of
trial.
II.

After several unsuccessful trial dates, the matter was
set for trial on September 16, 1991.
On June 12, 1991, counsel for the Dolans forwarded
CBS a letter informing it that the Dolans intended to
call William Platten, Sr., William Platten, Jr., Charles
Schulz and Richard Schulz as witnesses at trial.
In an effort to clarify the Dolans' witness list,
counsel for CBS forwarded a letter to counsel for the
Dolans on June 26, 1991, which stated, in part:

NUGENT, Judge:
I.

**1 In June, 1987, plaintiffs-appellants Michael and
Peggy Dolan (hereinafter "the Dolans ") filed a
complaint against defendant--appellee Cleveland
Builders Supply Co. (hereinafter "CBS") alleging that
bricks manufactured by CBS and incorporated into the
Dolans' house were not fit for their intended purpose
and, as a result, CBS had breached an implied
warranty.
The record reveals that in 1977, the Dolans
purchased five thousand bricks from CBS. Prior to
purchasing the bricks, Mr. Dolan informed CBS that
the bricks were for use in the construction of his
home. Mr. Dolan was told by a representative of
CBS that these bricks, designated as Independence
No. 75 R, were suitable for exterior use in northern
Ohio.

-

Page 1

For assistance in planning the construction of their
home, the Dolans used the services of Mrs. Dolans'
father, William Platten, Sr., who was a general
contractor. Mr. Platten had "overall control" over the
construction of the Dolans' home. The bricklayer
employed by the Dolans was recommended to them
by Mr. Platten, who had a long-standing business

It is my understanding that Mr. and Mrs. Dolan will
be called as lay witnesses while Mr. Manyo,
William Platten, Sr., William Platten, Jr., Charles
Schulz and Richard Schulz will be called as expert
witnesses at the time of trial. So that there is no
question regarding witnesses, please update your
Answers to Interrogatories or confirm the validity of
my understanding in writing.

No response was forthcoming from the Dolans until
the time period between August 9, 1991 and August
21, 1991, during which time the Dolans identified the
following individuals as witnesses:
Gene Suma,
Robert Doyle, John Wessel, Harry Ratka, Donald
DaCond, John Adams, Chris Lopez, George Nemeth,
Phillip Kerling, Warren Bucher, Jim Darcy, John
Powers, Vernon L. Burdick, Walter Kuhfeld, and
James Tann. Of these witnesses, an expert report was
provided for Mr. Doyle, Mr. Tann and Mr. Suma.
No information was provided regarding the remaining
witnesses other than their names.
On August 14, 1991, counsel for CBS forwarded a
letter to counsel for the Dolans stating, in pertinent
part:
**2 If the individuals named on page 2 of your
August 13th fax are witnesses whom you intend to

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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call at the trial of this matter, we are entitled to
addresses and some brief summary of the testimony
you expect to obtain from these individuals. If it is
genuinely your intention to call these witnesses in
this case, then please provide us, as soon as possible
due to the impending trial date, with the addresses of
these individuals and a summary of their testimony.
Please give this your immediate attention so that, in
the event it is necessary to depose those individuals,
the depositions can be taken before the trial.
We are not waiving any objection to the lateness of
your presentation of these witnesses nor are we
waiving any objection to them as witnesses in this
case by making this request.
Having received no response from the Dolans, on
August 28, 1991, CBS filed a motion to exclude these
witnesses from testifying at trial or, in the alternative,
motion to continue trial.
Additionally, on August 28, 1991, counsel for the
Dolans faxed CBS a copy of the expert report of
Vernon L. Burdick, a ceramics engineer. On August
29, 1991, CBS filed a motion to exclude Vernon L.
Burdick as an expert witness on the grounds that he
was identified as an expert less than thirty days before
trial.
The Dolans did not respond to either motion to
exclude.

standards for the testing of construction materials.
Further, he testified that with regard to the durability
of a brick product, ASTM C-216 was the applicable
standard. After reading ASTM C-216, Mr. Lopez
testified that if the average compressive strength of a
brick sample was greater than eight thousand PSI or
the average water absorption was less than eight
percent, then the test to determine the sample's
saturation coefficient would be waived. (FN2) In light
of the test results for compressive strength and cold
water absorption from the Dolans' tests, Mr. Lopez
testified that the saturation coefficient was waived in
this matter.
The Dolans' second expert, Steven Manyo, testified
that he inspected the Dolans' home, inspected the
brick and, based upon his inspection and review of
test results, offered his opinion that the reason the
brick was spalling was that there were laminations in
the brick which, when water penetrated, would fill up
with water and expand during freeze/thaw cycles.
Mr. Manyo also testified that the bricks were
acceptable in the industry at the time they were sold
because they passed the standards set forth in ASTM
C-216. On cross-examination, this statement was
explored in further detail. Mr. Manyo testified, as
did Mr. Lopez, that if the average compressive
strength was greater than eight thousand PSI or the
water absorption less than eight percent, then the
saturation coefficient would be waived.

III.

**3 The Dolans' next expert, Don Hollenbaugh,
testified that he performed a series of tests on brick
On crosssamples from the Dolans' home.
examination, Mr. Hollenbaugh testified that the
samples he tested conformed with ASTM standards
for compressive strength and cold water absorption.

At trial, the Dolans presented the testimony of six
expert witnesses, including: 1) Steven Manyo, who
has a degree in architecture; 2) Donald Hollenbaugh,
who is a manager for Solar Testing Laboratories,
which provides testing services for construction
materials; 3) William Platten, Jr., who is a civil
engineer; 4) William Platten, Sr., who is a general
contractor; 5) Chris Lopez, who is a civil engineer;
and 6) George Nemeth, who has been a bricklayer for
the past forty-one years. (FN 1)

The Dolans' fourth expert, William Platten, Jr., also
testified that a representative sample of brick from the
Dolans' home was subjected to a series of tests
Based on the
according to ASTM guidelines.
saturation coefficient, which he calculated, Mr.
Platten, Jr. concluded that the bricks were not suitable
for use in northern Ohio, a severe weather area. He
offered his opinion that the reason for the lack of
durability was because the bricks were far too
permeable, caused by a manufacturing defect.

Mr. Lopez testified that a representative sample of
brick from the Dolans' home was subjected to a series
of tests according to guidelines set by the American
Society for Testing Materials (ASTM). On crossexamination, Mr. Lopez indicated that ASTM sets the

On cross-examination, Mr. Platten stated that the
waiver provision of ASTM C-216 does not apply to
the Dolan brick based on the fact that the brick tested
had been used. Mr. Platten testified that ASTM
testing methods are written for new bricks before sale.

On September 17, 1991, the trial court granted both
motions to exclude.

-

Page 2

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works

1993 WL 215399, Dolan v. Cleveland Builders Supply Co., (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1993)
He stated that once bricks have failed in service, the
tests are used to assist in determining the reason for
their failure.
Mr. Platten's distinction between new and used
brick was contradicted by Mr. Willard Packman, the
expert retained by CBS. Mr. Packman testified that
the age of the brick or its use will not affect the
compressive strength test, the cold water absorption
test or the saturation coefficient.
Mr. Packman
testified that the Dolans' bricks passed both the cold
water absorption test and compressive strength test
and, therefore, the saturation coefficient and freeze/
thaw testing are waived.
Based on his inspection of the Dolan home and the
Solar Lab test results, Mr. Packman concluded that
the spalling was caused by water penetration and
freeze/thaw problems. He offered his opinion that the
reason the brick was spalling was due to improper
construction and, with regard to the chimney, failure
to follow approved plans.
In rebuttal, the Dolans presented the expert
Mr. Nemeth, a
testimony of George Nemeth.
bricklayer for forty-one years, testified that he
inspected the brickwork at the Dolans' home,
including the chimney, and found it to be of good
quality.
At the close of all the evidence, the case was
submitted to the jury, which entered a unanimous
verdict for CBS.
The Dolans timely appeal and assign three errors for
our review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
THE MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES IN
THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF ANY
VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RULES OF
PROCEDURE NOR ANY EVIDENCE OFFERED
IN SUPPORT OF SUCH MOTION ESPECIALLY
WHEN SUCH ORDER HAD THE EFFECT OF
THE
CLAIM
OF
THE
DISMISSING
APPELLANT.

Page 3

EXPERT TO APPEAR ON BEHALF OF THE
APPELLEE WHEN SUCH EXPERT WAS NOT
EVEN REVEALED TO APPELLANT UNTIL SIX
WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL OF THE ACTION.
**4 We address the Dolans' first and second
assignments of error together since the Dolans claim
in each that the trial court erroneously excluded
relevant evidence when it granted the defendant's
motions to exclude.
Evid.R. 103(A)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and * * * in case the
ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of
the evidence was made known to the court by offer
or was apparent from the context within which
questions were asked. * * *
A motion to exclude evidence, if granted, is a
tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling by the
trial court reflecting its anticipatory treatment of an
evidentiary issue. State v. Grubb (1986), 28 Ohio
St.3d 199, 201, 202. Accordingly, a proponent who
has been temporarily restricted from producing
evidence by virtue of a motion to exclude evidence
must seek the introduction of the evidence, by proffer
or otherwise at trial, in order to enable the court to
make a final determination as to its admissibility and
to preserve any objection on the record for purposes
of appeal. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus;
Collins v. Storer Communications, Inc. (May 5,
1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 55420, unreported.
A trial court has broad discretion in the admission
and exclusion of evidence, and a reviewing court shall
not reverse a trial court's judgment for failure to
admit or exclude evidence unless the trial court has
clearly abused its discretion and the complaining party
has suffered material prejudice. Columbus v. Taylor
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 164.
Accordingly, we
would not reverse the trial court's judgment unless the
trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or
unconscionably in excluding the evidence and the
complaining party has suffered material prejudice.
Id. at 165.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

-

THE
TRIAL
COURT
WRONGFULLY
THE
EXPERTS
OF
THE
EXCLUDED
APPELLANT WHEN IT PERMITTED A NEW

In their first assignment of error, the Dolans argue
that witnesses listed in CBS' s motion to exclude, filed
August 28, 1991, with the exception of Vernon L.
Burdick and James Tann, effectively precluded them

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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from presenting a claim of fraud. (FN3)
MR. RYAN: I understand.
Our review of the record shows that the Dolans
failed to perfect their rights to appeal the exclusion of
the contested witnesses since they failed to proffer the
substance of that evidence at trial. In fact, counsel for
the Dolans specifically declined to proffer evidence
supporting a claim of fraud prior to trial. Counsel for
the Dolans engaged in the following dialogue with the
court:
MR. RYAN: I would like to address it in the
context, a ruling was made yesterday by Judge
Friedman in regards to the exclusion of several
witnesses. As I indicated to the Court yesterday *
* * generally, I would not bother this particular
Court with a pretrial motion, with a start of trial
motion, but this particular motion has to do with
our ability to put on a claim that my clients are
maintaining through me they have a valid claim.

-

**5 My personal feeling is, I don't want to get into
this, your Honor, because I spent several years on
at least five of these cases, and I have spent a lot
of time as to the issue of whether or not CBS had
prior knowledge of the sale of the bricks. Mr.
Farchione knows that I have dropped that claim on
four other cases.
I think that's a fair
representation.
MR. FARCHIONE: I would agree with that.
MR. RYAN: My client, Peggy Dolan, in June,
when we had some misunderstanding as to a
settlement in this case, made inquiry of me what
would be needed to prove an allegation of fraud.
I indicated to her that we would need very strong
evidence to show that someone within Cleveland
Builders Supply had prior knowledge of the defect
of the brick, that it was obvious that this defect
was running through all of the brick and he
continued to sell the brick.
Mrs. Dolan on her own, without my direction,
obtained through the summer the names of several
witnesses and information from them.
As she conveyed the names and addresses to me, I,
then, immediately conveyed them to Mr.
Farchione by August, as soon as I got them. * * *

-

THE COURT: I've told you already, that's been
ruled on. I'm not going to go back into that now.

***
***
MR. RYAN: Your Honor, just so I can move this
case along, rather than bother the Court with
attempting to put on witnesses--! don't want to be
unfair to the Court, but my understanding is that
with the exclusion of that testimony, it's almost
impossible for me to prove the allegations of
fraud.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. RYAN: I'm not going to trouble the Court
with that, but the Court understands I have the
opportunity to appeal that ruling by Judge
Friedman to the Court of Appeals.
THE COURT: Of course. Of course.
Further, the substance of the excluded evidence was
not revealed from the context within which evidence
was developed at trial. Compare State v. Gilmore
(1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 190. Since the substance of
that testimony was not revealed by proffer or
otherwise, this court cannot determine whether its
exclusion prejudiced the Dolans. Evid.R. 103(A).
Accordingly, we overrule the Dolans' first assignment
of error.
Turning to the Dolans' second assignment of error,
the Dolans contend that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the expert testimony of Mr.
Burdick and Mr. Tann. The Dolans argue that the
late announcement of these expert rebuttal witnesses
was due to the late production of the expert report of
Mr. Willard Packman by CBS.
Although the Dolans characterize the announcement
of Mr. Packman as an expert for CBS as an
"ambush," our review of the record shows that
counsel for the Dolans consented to the late
production of Mr. Packman's report. The record
reveals the following: On June 11, 1991, counsel for
CBS received a facsimile from the Dolans' counsel
containing the expert report of William Platten, Jr.,
civil engineer. In response, counsel for CBS faxed a
letter to the counsel for the Dolans on June 12, 1991,
which stated, in part:
**6 I am in receipt of your facsimile of June 11,

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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1991, containing your new expert report drafted by
Mr. Platten [Jr.], and dated June 5, 1991. I will not
object to the production of this report so close to
trial, so long as I may have the house inspected, and
produce a report by an expert in the same field as
Mr. Platten. I would like to do this during the week
of June 17, 1991. Please advise today, either by
return facsimile, or by contacting my secretary.

A. I have not see the Dolan residence, and cannot
comment on it.

In response, the Dolans' counsel faxed a letter dated
June 12, 1991 stating, in part, " * * * I have no
objection to your having an expert review the home of
my clients, so that he can come up with a report for
you."

Based on Mr. Tann's own testimony, he would not
have added any information relevant to fraud or
whether the brick was defective. Accordingly, the
trial court's pretrial ruling did not substantially
prejudice the Dolans.

Nothing in this train of events suggests that CBS
"ambushed" the Dolans when it identified Mr.
Packman as an expert on its behalf.

As was the situation with Mr. Tann, the Dolans also
failed to proffer any information as to how Mr.
Burdick would support their allegations as required by
Evid.R. 103. Assuming, arguendo, that the substance
of the excluded evidence is contained in Mr.
Burdick's written report, we note that the trial court's
exclusion of such evidence was within its discretion.
(FN4)

With regard to Mr. Tann, the Dolans failed to
proffer any information as to how Mr. Tann would
support their allegations as required by Evid.R. 103.

-

Assuming, arguendo, that the substance of the
excluded evidence is contained in Mr. Tann's
deposition testimony, which was filed with the trial
court, we note that the trial court's exclusion of such
evidence would not warrant reversal.
At his
deposition, Mr. Tann testified as follows:

Q. When were you first contacted about this matter?
A. I was contacted by Mrs. Dolan in the early part
of 1991, probably March.

Q. What were you asked to do, and what
information was provided to you at that time?

-
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A. I was asked for information on performing an
inspection of their residence, as far as the
condition or existing condition of the brick in
question. As we are a trade association of brick
manufacturer's policy on performing inspections, it
is a service to our member manufacturers and
asking Ms. Dolan, the manufacturer of the brick in
question, it was determined that they were a nonmember of ours in the past, and that we were
unable to perform that inspection, because of our
policies. We did, then, forward some names of
other experts in the field that she may want to
contact.
***
***

Q. Mr. Tann, do you have any opinions relative to
the design, the masonry work, the mortar, the
maintenance or construction of the Dolan
residence?

Civ.R. 16 empowers courts to adopt rules regarding
the exchange of expert reports of witnesses to be
called at trial. Former Loc.R. 21.1 of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, General Division,
provided as follows:
**7 (A) Since Ohio Civil Rule 16 authorizes the
court to require counsel to exchange the reports of
medical and expert witnesses expected to be called
by each party, each counsel shall exchange with all
other counsel written reports of medical and expert
witnesses expected to testify in advance of the trial.
The parties shall submit expert reports in accord
with the time schedule established at the Case
Management Conference.
The party with the
burden of proof as to a particular issue shall be
required to first submit expert reports as to that
issue. Thereafter, the responding party shall submit
opposing expert reports within the schedule
established at the Case Management Conference.
Upon good cause shown, the court may grant the
parties additional time within which to submit expert
reports.
(B) A party may not call an expert witness to testify
unless a written report has been procured from the
witness and provided to opposing counsel. It is
counsel's responsibility to take reasonable measures,
including the procurement of supplemental reports,
to insure that each report adequately sets forth the

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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-

expert's opinion. However, unless good cause is
shown, all supplemental reports must be supplied no
later than thirty (30) days prior to trial. The report
of an expert must reflect his opinions as to each
issue on which the expert will testify. An expert
will not be permitted to testify or provide opinions
on issues not raised in his report.
(Emphasis
added.)

court had a duty to give a curative instruction to the
jury regarding their inapplicability, notwithstanding
that fact that counsel never requested a curative
instruction and failed to object to the omission of a
curative instruction. Moreover, it was the Dolans
who introduced the ASTM standards as an exhibit.

The trial court has discretion to determine whether a
party has complied with Loc.R. 21.1 and to determine
the appropriate sanction for its transgression. Pang v.
Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 194.
Such
determinations will not be reversed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 194.

At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time
during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any
party may file written requests that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the requests.
Copies shall be furnished to all other parties at the
time of making the requests. The court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action on the requests prior
to counsel's arguments to the jury and shall give the
jury complete instructions after the arguments are
completed. The court also may give some or all of
its instructions to the jury prior to counsel's
arguments.
The court need not reduce its
instructions to writing.

In this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding the expert opinion
of Mr. Burdick. Despite the Dolans' argument to the
contrary, we find no support for the motion that
Loc.R. 21.1 does not apply to the production of
expert reports used for purposes of rebuttal. Clearly,
by using the phrase "all supplemental reports,"
Loc.R. 21.1 makes irrelevant the intended purpose of
the report. Absent a demonstration of how the Dolans
were prejudiced by the exclusion of Mr. Burdick's
expert opinion, this court will not endeavor to create
reasons. We conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony
of Mr. Burdick.
The Dolans' second assignment of error is not well
taken and is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
CHARGING THE JURY THAT THE AMERICAN
STANDARD TESTING METHODS (ASTM) HAD
NO RELEVANCY AND SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT THEIR
VERDICT AND FURTHER SHOULD HA VE
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE WAIVER
CLAUSE CONTAINED IN EXHIBIT 27 WHICH
WAS C-216 OF THE ASTM HAD NO
APPLICATION NOR RELEVANCY IN THE
TRIAL OF THE ACTION.

-
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In their third assignment of error, the Dolans
contend it was that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury that the ASTM standards did not
apply, in any manner, in this case. The Dolans argue
that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence
regarding ASTM standards and, therefore, the trial

**8 Civ.R. 5l(A) provides as follows:

On appeal, a party may not assign as error the
giving or the failure to give any instruction unless
the party objects before the jury retires to consider
its verdict, stating specifically the matter objected to
and the grounds of the objection. Opportunity shall
be given to make the objection out of the hearing of
the jury.
The rationale behind this rule is two-fold: the object
of the portion of the rule requiring the parties to enter
their objections to the charge before the jury retires to
consider the verdict is to allow the court, while it still
has the chance, the opportunity to correct the error or
omission before the jury begins its deliberations.
Presley v. Norwood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 29. The
object of the portion of the rule requiring the court to
inform counsel, prior to jury argument, of its
proposed action upon requested instructions is to
require the judge to inform the trial lawyers what the
charge is going to be so they may conform their
arguments to law and intelligently argue the case to
the jury.
Where a party fails to interpose a specific objection
to the court's instructions, the error or omission is
waived, absent a finding of plain error. Reichert v.
Ingersoll (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 220. Although the
plain error doctrine is a principle applied almost
exclusively in criminal cases, the Ohio Supreme Court
has stated that the doctrine may also be applied in
civil causes, even if the party seeking to utilize the
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1993 WL 215399, Dolan v. Cleveland Builders Supply Co., (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1993)
doctrine failed to object to the court's charge to the
jury. Id. at 225.

erred in failing to give a curative instruction regarding
their applicability.

In order for an unrequested, unobjected-to jury
instruction to rise to the level of plain error, it must
appear on the face of the record not only that error
was committed, but that except for the error, the
result of the trial clearly would have been otherwise
and that not to consider the error would result in a
clear miscarriage of justice. State v. Underwood
(1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, paragraph one of the
syllabus.

Accordingly, the Dolans' third assignment of error
is not well taken and is overruled.

The Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that
courts of appeals should take notice of plain error
charily, see State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, to
correct only particularly egregious errors--those
errors that "would have a material adverse effect on
the character and public confidence in judicial
proceedings." Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. (1982),
70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209.
See, also, Yungwirth v.
McAvoy (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 285, 288.

-
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**9. In the instant case, the trial court did not err in
failing to instruct the jury that ASTM standards did
not apply.
In an effort to show that the bricks were defective
when they purchased them in 1977, the Dolans
presented evidence that in 1988, the bricks failed to
conform to ASTM requirements for absorption and
saturation. Mr. Platten, Jr. testified that based on the
bricks' extremely high saturation coefficient, they
were not suitable for use in northern Ohio, a severe
weather area.
In direct contradiction to this testimony, CBS
presented evidence that the bricks met ASTM
standards for compressive strength and water
absorption and, therefore, according to ASTM C-216,
CBS was not required to calculate the saturation
coefficient. This evidence was not offered by CBS, as
the Dolans could have us believe, to mislead the jury
into thinking that the waiver provision of ASTM
C-216 acted as a legal bar to their consideration of the
evidence. Rather, CBS offered this evidence to show
that the bricks did not contain a manufacturing defect.
As the evidence established that ASTM standards
were relevant to a determinative issue, that is whether
the bricks contained a manufacturing defect at the
time they were sold, we cannot say that the trial court

PATTON, P.J., and BLACKMON, J., concur.
N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third
sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see
Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this
document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at
which time it will become the judgment and order of
the court and time period for review will begin to run.
FN 1. The trial court permitted the Dolans to present
the expert testimony of Mr. Lopez in their case-inchief and Mr. Nemeth on rebuttal, notwithstanding
the fact that both individuals had been excluded
when CBS's August 28, 1991 motion to exclude was
granted.
FN2. ASTM C-216 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
4.1 Durability. * * * If the average compressive
strength is greater than 8,000 psi (55.2MPa) or the
average water absorption is less than 8.0% after
24-h submersion in cold water, the requirement for
saturation coefficient shall be waived.
4.2 Freezing and Thawing. * * * Note 1-Brick are
not required to perform to the provisions of 4.2
[freezing and thawing], and these do not apply
unless the sample fails to conform to the
requirements
for
absorption and
saturation
coefficient prescribed in Table II or the strength and
absorption requirements in 4 .1.
FN3. This court has not been asked to determine
whether the complaint of the Dolans sufficiently sets
forth a claim of fraud within the meaning of Civ.R.
9(A). See Baker v. Conlan (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d
454.
FN4. In Mr. Burdick's written opinion, he concluded
that the bricks were unsound and not durable enough
for use in northern Ohio. He offered the opinion
that the reason for the lack of durability was
immature firing temperatures at the time of
manufacture.
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